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Estes v. State, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 96, (Nov. 30, 2006)1
 
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE 
 
Summary 
 
 Appeal from a conviction, by jury, of two counts of preventing or dissuading a person 
from testifying or producing evidence, one count of first-degree kidnapping, two counts of 
battery with intent to commit a crime, six counts of sexual assault of a minor under 14, two 
counts of coercion, and two counts of lewdness with a child under 14.  The primary issue on 
appeal was the admissibility of evidence gathered while the Appellant was committed to a 
mental institution for the purpose of evaluating competency to stand trial. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 All but five of the convictions were upheld.  The Court remanded for dismissal of one 
count of battery with intent to commit sexual assault and two counts of lewdness with a minor.  
The Court also remanded for further proceedings on the two counts of dissuading a witness, for 
the judgment of conviction to reflect that the Appellant was convicted by a jury rather than a 
guilty plea and to correct, if necessary, the number of days credited for time served. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 The Appellant, Donald Estes, was accused of sexually assaulting a minor victim, B.C., in 
a desert area outside of Las Vegas.  Estes was charged with six counts of sexual assault of a 
minor under the age of 14 years, two counts of lewdness with a child under the age of 14 years, 
two counts of battery with intent to commit a crime, two counts of coercion, two counts of 
preventing or dissuading a person from testifying or producing evidence, and one count of first-
degree kidnapping.  Because preliminary findings showed that Estes was not competent to stand 
trial, the district court committed him twice to the Lake’s Crossing Center for Mentally 
Disordered Offenders.  Eventually, relying on evaluations provided by Lake’s Crossing staff, the 
district court found Estes competent to stand trial. 
 Estes plead not guilty by reason of insanity and testified as the only defense witness.  
Estes testified to his mental health problems beginning as a young adult and claimed that lithium 
prescribed for bipolar disorder caused him to victimize B.C.  He admitted many of the alleged 
conduct, “stating that ‘if B.C. said he did it,’ he probably did.”2
 The State presented three Lake’s Crossing staff people as rebuttal witnesses who had 
either observed or treated Estes.  Dr. Neighbors testified that psychological testing of Estes 
revealed occasional feigned mental illness.  Further, she testified that no member of the treatment 
team had observed Estes “in a psychotic state or viewed him as incompetent during his second 
commitment.”3  Dr. Henson testified that Estes attempted to introduce a history of mental illness 
deliberately “to avoid more severe prosecution, that Estes did not suffer from lithium poisoning, 
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and that Estes desired to be medicated to support his claim that he had a disabling mental 
condition.”4  Both doctors also testified that Estes knew right from wrong and did not suffer any 
mental condition that would impair his judgment.  Indeed, the doctors testified that Estes’ 
behavior “seemed deliberate and thoughtful.”5
 The third member of the Lake Crossing staff who testified was social worker Ms. 
Coronella.  She testified that the defendant had revealed an interest to her in preparing an 
insanity defense.  While Estes had testified that his mental illness caused him to divorce his wife, 
Ms. Coronella testified that Estes had told her that he divorced his wife because she had an 
extramarital affair. 
 A jury convicted Estes on all counts and Estes was sentenced to a total of 40 years 
imprisonment with 898 days’ credit for time served. 
 Estes argued on appeal several trial errors that cumulatively, he asserted, warranted a 
reversal of all the convictions.  The most significant was the State’s use of the Lake’s Crossing 
staff as witnesses.  Additionally, he asserted the following errors: (1) the State’s portrayal of him 
as a liar during closing argument based upon the Lake’s Crossing staff testimony; (2) denial of 
his proffered involuntary intoxication instructions; (3) use of the wrong jury instruction 
concerning his insanity defense; (4) admission of hearsay evidence; (5) admission of a 
photograph of B.C.; (6) admission of video testimony given by the victim’s deceased father; (7) 
admission of an audiotape and transcript of Estes’ voluntary statement to police; (8) the court’s 
failure to merge a count of battery with intent to commit a crime with one of the sexual assault 
counts; and (9) the state failed to provide substantial evidence supporting the charges of 
dissuading a witness, battery with intent to commit a crime and lewdness with a minor.    
 
Discussion 
 
Use of Testimony from the Lake’s Crossing Staff
 
 First, the Court clarified that, generally, statements made by a defendant to personnel 
during a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation are not admissible against the defendant.6  The 
Court reasoned that if a defendant knew such statements might be used against him, he would 
cease to be candid and thus defeat the purpose of such evaluations.  However, the Court 
distinguished cases wherein defendants put their sanity in controversy by presenting an insanity 
defense.7  The Court concluded that “when the defendant places his sanity or mental capacity at 
issue, a defendant’s right to protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments from the 
disclosure of confidential communications made during a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation 
relates only to the incriminating communications themselves.”8  Hence, when a defendant seeks 
to introduce such an evaluation or portions of it in support of an insanity defense, the prosecution 
may also rely on the evaluation for rebuttal purposes. 
Accordingly, the Court held that there was no error in the admission of testimony by Ms. 
Coronella.  The Court reasoned that the conversation about preparing an insanity defense was 
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properly admitted for rebutting Estes’ claims of mental illness.  Furthermore, nothing Estes said 
to Ms. Coronella was incriminating; “a statement is not ‘incriminatory’ merely because it tends 
to show that the defendant is sane.”9  Additionally, the statement concerning the cause of Estes’ 
divorce was admissible to impeach Estes’ testimony at trial.  Because none of this information 
was incriminating, but only related to the validity of Estes’ insanity defense, it was admissible. 
 Moreover, the Court held that the district court did not err by admitting Dr. Neighbor or 
Dr. Henson’s testimony.  The Court again distinguished the Estes’ case because Estes had made 
his sanity an issue in the case.  Further, the testimony by both doctors was “within their stated 
areas of expertise and did not reveal their confidential communications other than by 
inference.”10  Estes also challenged both doctors’ testimony that he knew right from wrong.  The 
Court had previously clarified that the ability to distinguish right from wrong “is directly linked 
to the nature of the defendant’s delusional state.”11  Although the doctors did not recite the full 
legal standard for insanity, the district court did instruct the jurors that the court would be 
informing them concerning the proper legal standard.  Therefore, the Court concluded, any error 
in this regard was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 Dr. Neighbors’ testifying that Estes’ behavior struck her as deliberate and thoughtful 
violated the rule prohibiting psychiatric testimony that a defendant had the mental state 
constituting an element of the crime charged.12  However, the Court concluded that the error did 
not warrant reversal and cautioned the prosecution from introducing such testimony in the future.  
Additionally, the Court found no error in the State’s closing arguments despite Estes’ contention 
that the prosecution inappropriately portrayed him as a liar. 
 
Jury Instruction on Insanity and Involuntary Intoxication
 
 While defendants are entitled to a jury instruction on their theories, “no matter how weak 
or incredible they may be,” there must be at least some competent evidence in the record to 
support the theory.13  The Court held that Estes offered no evidence, other than his “irrelevant 
lay opinion,” that he had been intoxicated by lithium toxicity.  In fact, the only competent 
evidence in the record suggested this was not the case.  The Court held there was no error in 
refusing the defendant’s request for an involuntary intoxication instruction and, even had the 
district court erred, such an error would have been harmless.  Estes also argued that the insanity 
instruction was insufficient because it did not specify that the jury was to consider his mental 
state during the commission of the offense, not before or after.  The Court disagreed, holding that 
the text of the instruction left the “clear inference that the delusional state must exist at the time 
of the offense charged.”14
 
Cumulative Error
 
 Estes argued that, aside from the asserted errors above, the introduction of a videotape of 
the victim’s deceased father and the duplicative admission of audio taped and transcribed 
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versions of Estes’ statement to police were prejudicial.  Additionally, Estes challenged the 
showing of a photograph of the victim taken at the preliminary hearing on relevance grounds.  
Lastly, Estes challenged on hearsay grounds the admission of the victim’s medical records, 
police testimony as to the victim’s statements and Dr. Neighbors’ testimony about the opinions 
of other staff members.  Cumulatively, Estes claimed, these evidentiary errors merited reversal of 
all convictions.   
 The Court rejected the claim that the medical records were inadmissible hearsay because 
the victim testified at trial.  Further, the Court rejected that testimony by the police officers was 
inadmissible because Estes’ counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine the victim about these 
statements.  With respect to Dr. Neighbors’ testimony as to the opinions of other staff members, 
the Court agreed with Estes that admission of the testimony was likely erroneous.  However, the 
Court noted that NRS 50.285 allows expert witnesses to base opinions on information otherwise 
inadmissible so long as the information is of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
field.  Dr. Neighbors’ reliance on the opinions of colleagues was, therefore, “marginally 
appropriate.”15
 Although the admitted photograph of the victim had “marginal probative value,” the 
Court concluded that its introduction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt “given the 
overwhelming evidence presented by the State. . . .”16  Concerning the videotaped testimony of 
the father, the Court concluded that the potential prejudice was outweighed by the probative 
value of the testimony.  The tape demonstrated the scope of the father’s consent regarding Estes’ 
transportation of the victim. 
 Lastly, the Court rejected that the duplicative introduction of both an audiotape and 
written transcript of Estes’ statement to police warranted reversal.  The Court concluded that 
cumulatively the alleged evidentiary errors were minor and that “the overwhelming evidence 
inculpated Estes in the crimes alleged.”17
 
Errors Claimed with Respect to Individual Charges
 
 Merger 
  
 Estes argued that count three of his conviction, battery with intent to commit a crime, 
merged with the sexual assault count.  Estes claimed the battery went to the “lack of consent” 
element of the sexual assault charge and that the State was constitutionally prohibited from 
charging him twice for the same crime.  The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that battery 
requires physical force or violence while sexual assault requires neither.  Moreover, the charges 
referred to distinct acts. 
 
 Substantial Evidence
 
 Estes also argued that the State failed to prove five of the counts beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  The Court proceeded to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution.18  Concerning the two counts of dissuading a witness, the State premised one count 
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on Estes’ threat to kill the victim’s parents should she report the incidents.  The second count 
was premised on Estes’ offer of money to the victim not to report him.  Estes claimed that 
because B.C. was not under subpoena or yet a potential witness at the time of the alleged threats, 
the State did not meet its burden.  Moreover, Estes argued that the jury instruction was 
erroneously based on NRS 199.305 because the statute was not relied on in the original charging 
document.  Estes urged that the proper instruction fell under NRS 199.230.  The Court agreed 
that the State wrongly offered a jury instruction based on a statute other than the one used in the 
charging document. 
 Additionally, the Court reversed Estes’ conviction for battery with intent to commit 
sexual assault, for allegedly grabbing the victim’s throat, because the victim did not testify as to 
this particular act.  Finally, the Court reversed the two counts alleging lewdness with a minor.  
The Court observed that the victim never testified that Estes touched the areas in question.  
Therefore, the Court agreed that the evidence failed to establish those two charges. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court summarized that “[w]hen the prosecution seeks to use a court-ordered 
psychiatric evaluation to rebut an insanity defense, the prosecution may not utilize the portions 
of the evaluation containing the defendant’s statements that directly relate to culpability for the 
crimes charged. . . .”19  The prosecution may, however, “use other portions of the evaluation to 
rebut an insanity defense.” 20  Therefore, Estes’ rights were not violated in this case. 
 The Court found error regarding the admission of a portion of Dr. Neighbors’ testimony 
but concluded “that the overwhelming evidence against Estes militates against reversal.”21  The 
Court remanded for dismissal the count for battery with intent to commit sexual assault and the 
two counts for lewdness with a minor because of the State’s failure to meet its burden on those 
charges.  Additionally, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings concerning the two 
counts for dissuading a witness.  Lastly, the Court remanded to have the judgment of conviction 
changed to reflect that Estes was convicted by a jury rather than a guilty plea and to assess 
whether the number of days’ credit for time served was accurate. 
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